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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
DELORES E. GREN, individually
and as Guardian Ad Litem of Gordon
V. Gren, Geraldine Gren, and Vivian
Gren, minor children of Melvin V.
Gren, Deceased,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

CASE
NO. 7341

vs.
PRESTON L. NORTON and M.
NORTON
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS

as

Plaintiffs are referred to herein as the plaintiff or
respondents. Melvin V. Gren is referred to as the deceased.
Defendants Preston L. Norton and M. Norton are referred
to by name or as the defendants or as appellants.
Respondents agree with the fact statements contained
in appellants' Brief, in so far as they relate to the physical
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features of the intersection at which the collision occurred.
Many other citations of fact set forth in appellants'
Brief are also satisfactory to respondent. Numerous other
citations of fact therein contained are either without proper
foundation in the transcript or are contrary to other evidence presented at the trial.
In order to avoid great duplicity, due largely to the
number and the arrangement of appellants' assignments of
error, the respondents have set forth the facts upon which
they rely, together with the transcript citation thereof, in
the argument under the respective assignments of error.
ERROR NO.1
Order Overruling Defendant's Motion for a Directed Verdict

The appellants have asserted nine grounds for their
motion. Grounds Nos. 1, 2, and 3 appear to be without any
merit Whatever, and the appellants should be deemed to so
concede, in view of the fact they. neither argued the same
below nor claim anything for them on Brief.
Grounds 4, 5, 6, and 8 deal with the alleged failure of
the plaintiffs' deceased to keep a proper or any lookout.
The situation in the instant case differs from that in Bullock vs. Luke, 98 Utah 510, 98 P (2) 350, and Hickok vs.
Skinner, Utah, 190 P (2) 514, in that in those cases the
plaintiffs admitted facts from which it could be said, as a
matter of law, that they had failed to keep a proper lookout and were therby guilty of contributory negligence.
Here we have simply the question of whether, as a matter
of law, the appellants, by bringing in evidence to the effect
that the deceased was not looking to the left at a particular
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time as he crossed the intersection, have made a prima facie showing of contributory negligence. We think they
have not.
Witness Paul Adamson saw the deceased stop at the
stop sign. "I just saw the gentleman stop at the stop sign;
and then didn't take any more notice of him." (TR-32). He
didn't see him start up from the stop sign (TR-32), and
didn't notice the deceased again until the deceased was beyond the island. (TR-26). Witness Kenneth Adamson first
observed the deceased's car as it was "entering the easterlymost lane of the intersection," and he had not observed
it in the intersection prior to that time. (TR-126). The east
edge of the most easterly paved lane of the highway was
44 feet into the intersection. (TR-9 and Ex. 1). The witness stated that he did not continue to observe the deceased
and that he did not know whether the deceased looked right
or left or what the deceased did do. (TR-126). Undoubtedly, from his conflicting statements, the jury could reasonably have concluded that witness Kenneth Adamson did
not know Whether the deceased did or did not observe the
truck approaching. Witness defendant Preston L. Norton
did not even see the deceased until the deceased had reached
and was entering upon the east edge of the pavement (TR182), a distance of 44 feet into the intersection. (Ex. 1).
At that time defendant Norton was 500 to 600 feet North
of the intersection, according to witness Kenneth Adamson, (TR 130-132), and 250 to 300 feet according to his
own testimony. (TR-219). Defendant Norton could see
the deceased distinctly only when he, defendant Norton,
had arrived at approximately the last 100 feet. (TR-204).
The foregoing were the witnesses who testified with respect
to the actions of the deceased as he crossed the intersec-
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tion, and it can only be upon them that appellants rely.
From their testimony it could not be said, as a matter of
law, that the deceased failed to keep a lookout or that he
failed to keep a proper lookout. See Respondents' Argument and Authorities under Errors Nos. 9 and 10.
The appellants, on Brief, emphasize their version of
"the remarkable manner" in which deceased drove his car
across the intersection. The speed of the car is mentioned
as being extremely slow. Considering the speed with which
Preston Norton approached and traversed the intersection,
as a matter of direct comparison, we think it might well
be said that the speed of deceased's car was slow. However, we are taught that the law requires one to proceed
through an intersection at a reasonable and safe rate of
speed. Some of the witnesses estimated the deceased's
speed at from 10 to 15 miles per hour as he proceeded
across the intersection. (TR-53). We submit that such
rate of speed was entirely reasonable and prudent in the
circumstances. Be it remembered that the deceased, without hurrying or speeding up his vehicle, did in fact preempt the intersection, and that the defendant struck the
deceased only after deceased had reached the west dirt
shoulder of the road. At that time the deceased had left
approximately 22 feet of pavement that the defendant
could have traversed with safety had he taken ordinary
precautions.
Appellants claim the deceased was "slumped behind
the wheel, low in the car." But, an independent witness,
and one whose testimony was consistent and unshaken, saw
the deceased as deceased ,crossed the intersection and "there
was nothing unusual" about the driver. (Wesley Carter,
TR-51).
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The appellants make the point that shortly before the
impact the deceased raised up and attempted to turn his
car to the left. According to the testimony of witness Kenneth Adamson, the deceased raised up in the car when he
was about 5 feet from the west edge of the concrete. (TR122). At the speeds at which each of the vehicles were
traveling, the truck, at that time, would have been some
distance north of the point of impact and at about the spot
where the truck first veered off onto the west dirt shoulder
of the road. It could not be reasonably inferred from the
fact that the deceased raised up in his car that that was
the first he had seen the defendant approaching. It is entirely possible and probable that the deceased then saw the
defendant was taking a course whkh would surely result
in a collision. At the very least, there were several inferences that could- have been drawn from the deceased's action, and the jury was entirely free to choose between them.
The claim by the appellants that the deceased was intoxicated at the time of the collision was sham. Their
witnesses contradicted each other, and not one of the witnesses would or did testify that Gren was intoxicated at
the time of the accident. Witness Doyle Halladay testified
that the deceased came into a service station about 2:00
o'clock P. M. on the day of the collision, and that the witness serviced the deceased's car (TR-152); that the witness
had had opportunity to observe men who had been drinking
alcoholic liquor (TR-153), and he stated: "Well, he didn't
act out of the way. H~ was always full of humor. He
made a few wisecracks, as he always does when he came
around. After I serviced his car, he gave me the right
change and drove out going east on First North." Certainly, the jury could readily have found from the evidence
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that the deceased was not intoxicated at the time of the
collision.
In support of their motion for a directed verdict, the
appellants, by Grounds numbered 7 and 9, argue that the
deceased failed to yield the right-of-way to defendant Preston L. Norton. There is no evidence as to the position of
defendant's truck when deceased entered the intersection.
The evidence does disclose that at a time when the deceased
had reached the east edge of the concrete portion of the
highway, a distance of 44 feet into the intersection, defendant Norton's truck was "just coming around the bend, just
south of the river bridge," (Witness Kenneth Adamson,
TR-132), between 500 and 600 feet away from the intersection. (TR-133). Under such circumstances, we think
it cannot be said that the deceased had failed to yield the
right-of-way or that he was, as a matter of law, guilty of
contributory negligence in continuing to cross the intersection. In the following cases it has been held that the
plaintiffs therein were not guilty of contributory negligence,
as a matter of law, for proceeding into or across an intersection when the defendants' vehicles were the following
distances away: (250 feet) Harmon v. Bay Cities Transit
Co. (Cal.) 98 P (2) 226; (140 feet away when plaintiff was
half way across intersection). Pline v. Parsons, 231 Michigan 466, 204 N. W. 131; (150 feet) Weber v. Beeson, 197
Michigan 607, 164 N. W. 255; (75 feet) Brangi v. Marshall, 117 Conn. 675, 168 Atl. 21; (100 feet) Scurlock v.
Peglow, Mich., 249 N. W. 35; (135 feet) McGuire v. Brambilla (Pa.) 170 Atl. 332; (145 feet) Ward v. Guildea (Cal.)
186 Pac. 612; (200 feet) Dildine v. Flynn (Kans.) 227 Pac.
340; (100 feet) Krasnoff v. Koopitman (Pa.) 175 Atl. 711;
(V2 block) Groeschell V; Washington Choc. Co., (Wash.)
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All of these cases hold that in the circum224 P. 19;
stances the question of contributory negligence is for
the jury. In Enz v. Johns, (Cal.) 296 Pac. 115, the defendant
was approximately 100 feet to the right of the intersection
and the above rule was applied. See also: Page v. Mazzei (Cal.) 3 P. (2) 11; Couchman v. Snelling (Cal.) 295
P. 845; Wynne v. Wright (Cal.) 286 P. 1057; Keyes v. Hawley (Cal.) 279 P. 647; Keller v. Waddington (Wash.) 253
P. 646; Lee v. Stephens (Cal.) 47 P. (2) 1105.
By the defendant's own admission, his truck was approximately 100 feet north from the intersection when the
deceased had. passed the center island and was proceeding
across the west paved portion of the highway. (TR- 203).
~here there is no vehicle approaching from within 100 feet
of the intersection, the driver can assume that no car will
approach the crossing so rapidly as to arrive while he is
crossing. Calhoun v. D. C. and E. Mining Co. (Mo.) 209
S. W. 318. A motorist seeing another vehicle approaching
the intersection 100 feet away can properly assume that
the other car is not violating rules of prudence by excessive speed and that he has plenty of time to cross. Robinson v. Clemons (Cal.) 190 Pac. 203; and Flynn v. Helena
Cab and Bus Co. (Mont.) 21 P. (2) 1105; See also: Harrison v. Mikelson (Cal.) 32 P. (2) 162; Shelton v. Ackerman (Cal.) 4 P. (2) 598; Taxicab Co. v. Otenritter (Md.)
135 A. 587; Pline v. Parson (Mich.) 204 N. W. 131; Stryker
v. Haistie (Ore.) 282 P. 1087; Lachanse v. Meyers (Vt.)
129 A. 172; McHugh v. Mason (Wash.) 283 P. 184; Zuren
v. Whattey (Wis.) 251 N. W. 435; Stelmach v. Saul, 50 S.
W. (2) 721. See also: Carlin v. Worthington, 192 A. 356,
where the court held that the driver of an automobile on
unfavored highway was not negligent in entering an inter-
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section when the driver on the arterial highway was so far
away that he would not arrive at the intersection before
the first driver had cleared the highway unless he was
speeding.
Here the evidence shows that when the deceased was
44 feet into the intersection, the defendant's truck was between 500 and 600 feet North of the intersection. When
the deceased had passed the center island and had proceeded onto the west paved portion of the highway, the defendant's truck was still100 feet North of the intersection,
according to the estimate of its driver. At that time the
deceased had, at the very most, a space of 20 feet ahead
of him to cover in order to clear the intersection. There
is evidence that the deceased was moving from 10 to 15
miles per hour. The oncoming truck had to travel100 feet,
or 5 times the distance remaining to be travelled by deceased. If the deceased was travelling 10 miles per hour,
the defendant's truck could not have reached deceased at
the west edge of the pavement unless said truck was travelling at a speed in excess of 50 miles per hour. If deceased was moving at 12¥2 miles per hour, the truck could
not have collided with him at the west edge of the pavement unless the truck was travelling at a speed in excess
of 621j2 miles per hour. At a speed of 15 miles per hour
for deceased, the defendant's speed must have been 75 miles
per hour. The 55-foot skid marks prior to impact and the
179 feet of truck skid marks after point of impact, plus
the fact that the truck pushed or dragged an automobile
sideways for the last 179 feet, certainly points to a very
great and excessive speed on the part of the defendant.
In this case it can not be said that the deceased, as a
matter of law, failed to keep a proper lookout, nor can it
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be said, as a matter of law, that deceased was negligent

when he failed to stop his car in the intersection. The evidence clearly made a case for the jury, and the trial court
properly refused to grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
ERROR NO.2

Order Overruling Defendant's Motion for a Non Suit
On Brief appellants state that the argument and authorities relative to the failure of the court to grant a directed verdict are "in a large measure applicable." It is
stated on Brief that at the time the motion for non suit
was made, the testimony of defendant Preston Norton was
not before the court and that Paul Adamson's testimony
relative to the movement of the Gren car across the eaiterly half of the intersection was not before the court. Undoubtedly appellants intended to refer to Witness Kenneth
Adamson, since Paul Adamson was a witness for the plaintiff and had appeared at the trial only in the plaintiff's
main presentation.
At the time the motion for non suit was made there
was evidence that the defendant, travelling at a great and
excessive speed, had struck the deceased's automobile when
it was on the west dirt shoulder of the highway after the
deceased had stopped at the stop sign and after he had
practically traversed the intersection. Cf: Martin v. Sheffield, Utah, 189 P (2) 127, where the court held the evidence there sufficient to make out a prima facie case. In
Phillips v. Classen (Okla.), 219 Pac. 708, where the evidence indicated that a vehicle was driven slowly across
intersection and was struck after it had almost, but not
quite, passed out of the intersection, by a vehicle coming
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into the intersection at an excessive rate of speed, it was
held that the evidence was sufficient to establish primary
negligence on the part of the latter. In Horsley v. Robinson, Urtah, 186 P (2) 592, 599, the court pointed out that
it is universally recognized that negligence may be inferred
from the happening of the accident and the surrounding
facts and circumstances where the facts are such as to
reasonably justify such inference even though there is no
direct testimony to establish the exact grounds of negligence which caused the accident.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the negligence of the defendants was clearly established, not only
by direct evidence, but also by the surrounding facts and
circumstances, and there was no evidence whatever that
the deceased had been guilty of contributory ngligence.
That the deceased had been guilty of contributory negligence was an affirmative defense, and the burden of so establishing was upon the defendants.
ERRORS NOS. 3 AND 4
Alleged Error in court's 5th Instruction to. the jury.

On Brief appellants argue that there was no evidence
"as to many, if not all" of the grounds of negligence upon
Which the case was submitted to the jury.
Treating the specific grounds of negligence in the order in which they are outlined on page 40 of defendant's
brief, we point to some of the evidence in connection therewith:
Excessive and Unlawful Speed.

At a point 150 to 180 feet North of the intersection
the defendant was driving his lumber truck at a speed of
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from 50 to 55 miles per hour. (TR-51). The speed at that
place was 40 miles per hour. (TR-90).
\Vithout Due Regard for and in Violation of Traffic Rules
and Regulations.
At a time when the deceased was approximately 44
feet into the intersection, just at the edge of the east paved
portion thereof, the defendant Preston L. Norton, by the
testimony of their own witness, Kenneth Adamson, (TR126), was coming around the bend. (TR-131, 132). The
truck, at that time, was between 500 and 600 feet to the
North of the intersection. (TR-132). The jury could have
found that the defendant was therefore not "approaching
so closely on said highway as to constitute an immediate
hazard" within the meaning of Title 57-7-138 of the Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, and he failed to yield the right-ofway to the decedent as required by that section.
Traveling at 35 miles per hour, under the road and
load condition at the time and place of accident, the defendant's vehicle would have required from 175 to 200 feet
within which to stop. (TR-161 and 194). At the speed at
which the defendant was proceeding immediately prior to
the collision the defendant actually utilized a space from
55 feet 10 inches north of point of impact to 179 feet south
of impact-a distance of 234 feet 10 inches, before bringing his truck to a rest. ( R-62) . The wheels of his truck
were actually locked and the tires dragged for that great
distance, and the road was plainly marked for that distance
by the truck tire marks. (TR-79, 80, 81). For a distance
of 179 feet after point of impact the defendant's truck
pushed· or dragged the automobile which it had struck, and
then came to rest only after shearing off a 6 by 8 upright
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that had stood in its path. (TR-78, 79, 80). Under the evidence above outlined, we think it could hardly be argued
that, as a matter of law, the defendant was driving his
truck at a speed that was reasonable and prudent under
the conditions then prevailing, as is required by Section 577-113 (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1943. Moreover, in the
light of the evidence above set forth, could_it be said that
the defendant was driving at an appropriate reduced speed
as he approached and crossed the intersection of 5th North
and 12th West Streets as is required by subsection (c) ?
We think not. See Richards v. Palace I.;aundry Co., Utah,
186 P. 439, where the court pointed out that greater care
in required in approaching intersections than between
street crossings. These matters were all covered by the
court's instructions numbered from 6 to 10, inclusive. Instruction No. 5 should not be considered as standing alone.
Failure to Keep a Lookout.
The appellants (brief, page 17) ,state, "It will be noted
that from the stop sign at the Northeast corner of the intersection, there is a clear view for almost a mile along the
highway extending northerly . . . ." You can see as far
South coming towards the intersection as a person at the
stop sign can see towards the North. (Defendant Preston
Norton, TR-198). Yet, with that plain view, defendant
Norton did not even see or notice the decedent at the stop
sign, and did not see him at all until deceased had reached
the east side of the concrete portion of the highway. (TR182). When first observed by the defendant, the deceased
had travelled 44 feet across the intersection. (Ex. 1). Hence,
there is evidence for the jury, and from which the jury
could reasonably conclude that the defendant failed to keep
a proper or careful lookout.
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Failed to Operate the Truck So as to be Able to Stop or
Control the Same Within a Reasonable Distance in an
Emergency.
Defendant Preston Norton testified that his truck was
equipped with Westinghouse Air Brakes, (TR- 180), and
that he first applied his -brakes when he was approximately
100 feet north from the intersection. (TR-195). There
seems to be no dispute but that defendant's truck traveled
to a point 179 feet south of the point of impact. Officer
Brandon testified that there were continuous tire drag
marks made by the truck from a point 55 feet 10 inches
north of point of impact to a point 179 feet south of the
point of impact. (TR-62, 67, 73). Officer Brandon tried
the brakes on the truck in the course of his investigation
immediately after the accident and found that the brakes
were apparently working. (TR-63). From the above evidence it appears that the defendant's truck traveled 55 feet
10 inches in a locked condition prior to the impact and that
it dragged or pushed an automobile, sideways, in front of
it for an additional 179 feet. Such was the actual distance
required to halt defendant's truck as it proceeded through
an intersection in Provo City. By the estimate of each of
the defendants, a distance of 175 to 200 feet would be required to stop the truck, loaded as it was, under road conditions then prevailing, at a speed of 35 miles per hour.
We seriously doubt that any jury would, in the circumstances here presented, conclude other than that the defendant failed to operate his truck so as to be able to stop
or control the same within a reasonable distance. Of a certainty it was a proper question for the jury to determine.
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Failure to Apply Brakes.

According to defense witness Kenneth Adamson, the
dece4ent had reached and entered upon the east edge of
the concrete (44 feet into the intersection-Ex. 1) when the
defendant was just coming around the bend. (TR-132).
The bend was approximately 775 feet North of the intersection. (Ex. 1). Witness Adamson set the distance as between 500 and 600 feet away. (TR-133). He estimated
that the defendant's truck was between 250 and 300 feet
away from the intersection when the defendant first sounded his horn. (TR-123). Defendant Preston Norton testified that his truck was 250 to 300 feet North of the intersection when he first saw the deceased, (TR-219), and that
when he first saw the deceased he honked his hom and
checked his brakes, (TR-186), and that at that time he
recognized that there might be an emergency. (TR-186).
By the term "checking the brakes," the defendant Preston
Norton meant that it was just a precaution; ":You just hit
the brake. You don't hit it hard enough to lock the wheels,
but it slows you up a little bit." (TR-186). After reconnizing the danger at 300 feet, the defendant moved forward
200 feet to a point 100 feet from the intersection before he
attempted to materially reduce his speed by actually applying or setting his brakes. According to the investigating
officer, the brakes of the truck did not lock until the truck
reached a point 55 feet 10 inches north of the point of impact.

·n~:

: :i

Steering the Truck into the Path of Decedent's Automobile
and Onto the West Paved Portion of the Highway and
Onto the Dirt Shoulder Thereof.

There can be no doubt but that the deceased pre-emp-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tn

1

15

ted the intersection. Officer Brandon placed the center of
the impact at a point 2 feet 9 inches east of the west edge
of the pavement. (TR-68). Witness Wesley Carter observed the actual impact of the vehicles, and he testified
that impact occurred on the west dirt shoulder. (TR-52).
Witness Kenneth Adamson also stated that he had observed
the actual impact, and that it had occurred "off the ~st
edge of the highway." (TR-120). Defendant Norton was
100 feet north of the intersection when the deceased was
in the act of crossing the west paved portion of the highway. After that Defendant Norton started edging his truck
into the very path that was being taken by the deceased
and went to the west just as far as he possibly could, thereby striking the deceased after the deceased had cleared
the paved portion of the highway, and had left a space of
approximately 20 feet which the defendant could have utilized had defendant used ordinary care and prudence in
driving his vehicle.
Whether, under these circumstances, the course actually taken by the defendant was the course that would have
been taken by an ·Ordinary prudent person under like circumstances, was certainly a question for the jury. Cf: Keller v. Waddington, supra; Simmons v. Stephens, 191 P. 978;
Roller v. Daleys, Inc., (Cal.) 28 P. (2) 345.
ERRORS NOS. 5 AND 6
These assignments are directed to alleged error in the
trial court's sixth charge to the jury.

On brief appellants object to the use of the word "constantly" and to the use of the plural "intersections." Appellant cites no authority whatever. It should be noted
that the court clarified its language used in Instruction
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No. 6, with respect to the lookout required of the defendant, Preston L. Norton, in Instruction No. 25, by using the
words "to constantly keep a proper lookout." Moreover,
it has been held that an instruction that a motorist was
bound "to constantly observe the highway" did not constitute reversible error. Pfisterer v. Key, Ind., 33 N. E.
(2) 330.
Respondent feels that said assignments of error are
without merit.

noI

ter

ERRORS NOS. 7 AND 8
T~

assignments relate to alleged error on the part
of the court in giving Instruction numbered 8.
The first paragraph of the Instruction sets out the law
applicable to a vehicle entering a through highway in practically the exact wording of the statute at 57-7-138 (a).
Appellant's objection appears to run to paragraph 3. That
paragraph must, of course, be read in conjunction with all
other paragraphs of the Instruction. Paragraph 2 tells
the jury that the deceased was not required to wait at the
intersection if the defendant's truck was so far distant
that there was time to cross in safety. Paragraph 3 then
tells the jury that if they found from the evidence that the
defendant's truck was so close to the intersection as to indicate to a reasonably prudent person that by attempting
to cross the deceased would create an immediate hazard,
then the deceased was required to wait until the truck had
passed through the intersection before continuing across.
(Boldface supplied). Defendant's request numbered 7
would not add a thing to the instruction which was given.
We understand appellants' contention to be that the
deceased was required to stop within the intersection if an
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ordinary and prudent person, under lil{e or similar circumstances, would have done so. That theory was certainly
put to the jury in paragraph 3 of the Instruction in question.
The Instruction as given was clear and concise. It did
not prejudice the defendant in any way. Instruction numbered 11 is certainly very similar to the third paragraph
of Instruction 8, but the appellant took no exception thereto and did not complain of it.
By its Instruction numbered 24, the court instructed
the jury that it was the deceased's duty in entering and
traversing the intersection to exercise such care and caution as may be usually expected of an ordinarily prudent
person under like or similar circumstances, and that it was
deceased's duty to learn of the oncoming truck, to keep
out of its way, and to avoid injury therefrom, and that if
the jury found that the deceased failed to exercise such
care and diligence, and that but for such failure on his part,
if any, the accident would not have occurred, then the jury
should find for the defendants. The appellants would not
be entitled to instructions more favorable to them than the
instruction herein mentioned.
ERRORS NOS. 9 AND 10
By this assignment the appellants allege error on the
part of the court in respect to Instruction numbered 17.

At the outset, the appellant concedes that the presumption mentioned may exist in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, but it is then reasoned that such presumption
"ceases to have any force where the evidence shows that
the deceased drove his car directly into the path of an approaching truck when one glance would have permitted
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him to have avoided the accident."' May it be recalled that
the evidence in this case clearly shows that the deceased
had in fact practically cleared the intersection before he
was struck by the defendant.
There is no evidence that is contrary to the presumption that the deceased used due and proper care for his
own preservation and protection. Witness Paul Adamson
testified that he did not see the deceased from the stop
sign until just prior to the accident. He did not again observe the deceased until he was entering the west lane of
traffic beyond the Island (TR-26)". By that time the deceased had traversed a distance of approximately 99 feet.
(Ex. A). Witness Kenneth Adamson's testimony was so
confused and ambiguous that the jury would have been
entirely justified in completely disregarding it in its entirety. In any event, there was ample evidence from which
the jury could reasonably have· concluded that this witness
had not observed the deceased as he proceeded through
the intersection. The witness did not observe the deceased
at all until deceased was entering upon the east paved portion of the highway (TR-126), a distance of 44 feet into
the intersection. (Ex. A). The witness stated that he did
not continue to observe the deceased after he first saw him
and he did not know whether deceased looked to the right
or left. (TR-126). The deceased could have looked; (TR132). Moreover, prior to the actual impact, this witness
moved out of the car in which he had been sitting and went
around to the back of the car. (T'R-141). The remaining
witness was Preston L. Norton, the driver of the truck.
He did not know whether the deceased stopped at the stop
sign or not. (TR-200). And he didn't see the deceased at
all until the deceased was at the east edge of the concrete.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~I

19
(TR-182). By this witness's own admission he could only
have told whether the deceased was looking at a time when
his truck was approximately 100 feet away. (TR-204). Defendant's truck was 100 feet north of the intersection when
deceased passed the center island and entered on the west
portion of the highway, (TR-203), having traversed at least
88 feet of the intersection.
We think it may not be said that, as a matter of law,
there is a particular time or place, while he was traversing
the intersection, at which the deceased was required to observe the defendant, and we know of no requirement that
he must gaze or stare at the approaching truck. Under
the evidence, the deceased could have seen and noticed the
oncoming truck as he, the deceased, passed over a portion
comprising 88 feet of the intersection which said distance
would bring him to a point 22 feet east from the west edge
of the concrete traveled portion of the highway at a time
when defendant's truck was still more than 100 feet to the
north of the intersection. The deceased assumed that he
could clear the few remaining feet before the truck would
reach the intersection, and whether he was guilty of negligence by reason of his having so assumed was a question
for the jury. Appellants may not determine that for us.
The driver was killed, and we haven't the benefit of his testimony. Instead there arises a presumption that the deceased driver did use due care, and that presumption does
not fall unless and until there is direct evidence that is
clearly to the contrary. The Instruction itself so states by
the words "until the contrary is proved by a preponderance
of the evidence." See Hatzakorzian v. Rucker-Fuller Desk
Co. (Cal.) 239 Pac. 709, 714 and cases cited therein. A
presumption of due care instruction is not rendered erron-
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eous by the fact that there are eye witnesses, when their
testimony is not inconsistent with the presumption, Broun
v. Blair, 80 P (2) 95, or are not in irreconcilable conflict
therewith, Schulman v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 111 P (2)
924. See also: Asbury v. Goldberg, (Cal.), 47 P (2) 311.
The court in the Peters v. Lohr case stated, in part,
"a presumption will serve as and in the place of evidence in
favor on one party or the other until prima facie evidence
has been adduced by the opposite party." In the instant
case, the appellant did not make a prima facie showing by
evidence that the deceased had not maintained a lookout
or that he had been guilty of contributory negligence in any
respect as alleged.
The instruction here given was approved by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Packard v. O'Neil, 262 P. 881.
The court did not instruct the jury that the presumption was to be considered along with and as part of the
other evidence in the case. The court instructed the jury
that the presumption was not conclusive, but that it was
a matter to be considered by the jury, in connection with
all the other facts and circumstances in the case, and then
only for the purpose of determining whether the deceased
had been guilty of contributory negligence. (Boldface supplied). The respondent submits that the appellant was not
prejudiced in any way by the Instruction in question.
ERROR NO. 11

Appellants allege error on the part of the court for
permitting the jury to assess damages for the specific
amount of the funeral expenses.
Counsel for respondent is a little at a loss in determining how he should hanale this assignment of error. The
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case of Morrison v. Perry, 140 P (2) 772, at 780 and 781,
had been brought to the attention of the court and counsel early in the trial. Counsel for respondent started to
develop evidence from Witness Mrs. Gren to cover the claim
for funeral expenses. While he was so doing counsel for
appellants stated:
"I might say to the court that we will stipulate
that the changes were reasonable and that they were
paid by Mrs. Gren, but we won't stipulate to the admission of evidence and the admissibility of that particular testimony. We are endeavoring to save time.
We will stipulate to the expense, but not to the admissibility of it." (Boldface supplied). (TR-105).
Whereupon it was stipulated, in effect, that the funeral
expenses were $558.50, which said sum was "actually paid
by Mrs. Delores E. Gren." (Boldface supplied). (TR-105).
Now, perhaps both counsel for respondent and the
court put the wrong interpretation on the legal effect of
the words "actually paid by Mrs. Delores E. Gren." Certainly it was intended to mean that she had borne the economic loss and that she had not been and could not be
reimbursed out of the deceased's estate. While the record
does not show such fact, all of the parties and counsel knew
that there was absolutely nothing of value in the estate of
the decedent, and that no administrator had ever been appointed.
If the facts and circumstances here present do not remove the instant case from the ambit of Morrison v. Perry,
supra, then the decision in that case is dispositive of the issue, and the funeral expense award, in the amount of
$558.50, specially and specifically found by the jury, should
be remitted. Such a result would be an injustice to Mrs.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
Gren, occasioned, we think, by an apparent intent on the
part of counsel for appellants to cause that result.
ERROR NO. 12
It is contended by appellants that the court erred in
instructing the jury that the intersection of 5th West and
12th North constituted a single intersection.
Appellants' argument seems rather vague. At the outset it is stated that they do not contend that the mere fact
of a "safety"· zone, as appellant is wont to call it, in the
middle of the highway changed the general law applicable
to intersections. But, in the last sentence, they claim the
Instruction was prejudicial, since is "permits the jury to
ignore one of the most essential physical features of the
intersection, so far as the defense ·of the action is concerned."
In Schmidt v. City Ice and Fuel Co., 19 N. E. (2) 514,
where traffic lanes over which traffic moved in opposite
directions was separated by a center strip of grass or parkway, adjacent to the intersection, and movements were
controlled by a signal at the far side of the intersection,
the Ohio Court held that the crossing was but one intersection notwithstanding the center strip or parkway. See
also: Brown v. Wallace, 35 S. E. (2) 793; Holland v. Kohn,
38 A (2) 500; and Gilman v. Olsen, 265 Pac. 439.
The Instruction in question merely states the law with
respect to the intersection and settles the question of whether there was one or two intersections. We do not believe
that it would have been proper for the court to emphasize
any particular fact, which is only a part of the evidence, in
its Instruction. If the appellants claim that there were two
intersections, or if they claim that the question of whether
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or not there were two intersections was a question for the
jury, then appellants should have come forward with such
an instruction, and with authority in support of their position.
It may be noted that as often as possible the appellant
refers to the center island as a "'safety zone." A casual
glance at Ex. 1 will clearly illustrate that the strip was nothing more nor less than tapered islands so placed as to separate north- and south-bound traffic at an intersection where
the road curves slightly. At its widest point, the island is
only approximately 22 feet.
ERROR NO. 13

Appellants contend that the oourt erred in giving Instruction No. 23, relating to the application of the Last
Clear Chance Doctrine.
Courts of law resort to the Last Clear Chance Doctrine
in all proper cases when contributory negligence is pleaded
as a defense, and a jury is called to find the proximate
cause. Lang v. Washington Water Power Company, 258
Pac. 832. Whether the situation in any given case calls for
the application of the doctrine is a question for determination by the trial court from the facts of the particular case.
Hartly v. Lancaster, 165 Pac. 106; Burlie v. Stevens, 193
Pac. 684; Rossier v. Payne, 215 Pac. 366, Gardner v. Union
Oil Co., 13 P (2) 915; Johnson v. Southwestern Engineering
Co., 107 P (2) 417; Dembiur v. Pawtucket Cabinet Company, 193 A 622.
In the instant case, the testimony of the appellant's
witness, Kenneth Adamson, shows that this witness first
saw the defendant's truck as the truck was "rounding the
bend, coming from the north, out just on this side of the
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River Bridge." (TR-122). At that time the deceased's car,
the Chevrolet, was onto the east lane of the highway. (TR132). The truck was then 500 or 600 feet to the north of
the intersection. (TR-133). The witness first heard the
horn of the truck slightly after he observed the truck. He
estimated that the truck was 350 to 300 feet north of the
intersection at that time. (TR-123). The deceased did not
change his course or progress forward through the intersection (TR-125). Witness Preston N~rton testified that
he first observed the deceased as the deceased was entering upon the east edge of the concrete portion of the highway and at that time he, the said defendant, was about 250
or 300 feet to the north of the intersection. (TR-132 and
-219). At the bottom of the hill the defendant was travelling 40 miles per hour. (R-184). When the defendant first
started fo fully apply his brakes, at a place about 100 feet
north of the intersection, he was travelling at approximately 40 miles per hour. (TR-195). (According to the police
officer whO/ investigated the accident, the wheels of defendant's truck did not become locked until the truck had
reached a point about 55 feet 10 inches north of the intersection.) Defendant Preston Norton further testified that
when he first saw the deceased in the intersection he honked
his horn and checked his brakes. (TR-186). At a speed of
35 miles per hour with its then load, defendant's truck could
have been stopped within four times its length, or 175 to
200 feet. (TR-16 and 194). The reason that the defendant
honked his horn and checked his brakes when he first observed the deceased in the -intersection was because he recognized then that there might be an emergency.
"Q. Well at that time, when you checked your
brakes, you recognized that there might be an emer-
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gency, didn't you?"
A. That is exactly right; and that is why I
checked them. That is why I honked the horn." (TR213).
Moreover, defendant Norton testified that he continued to observe the deceased from the time he first saw him
and that the path of the deceased's car, from the time the
witness saw it, was "directly west with the intersection
there; and at no time did I see it falter, turn one way or the
other, or stop, or speed up, or anything. It was one steady
speed." (TR-188) .
In response to the question by counsel for appellant as
to how the driver looked as he went across the intersection, defendant Preston L. Norton replied:
"Well, I couldn't see his face and I did observe him
very close. All I could see, it looked like quite a heavy
set fellow with a hat on; and he was kinda slumped
over wheel with his head and face directly west. I
couldn't get his attention to turn his head whatsoever.
Q. How long did he continue in that particular
position?
A. All the way across it, all the time I was observing him up until practically the point of impact."
(TR-188L
Hence, we have here, under appellant's own evidence,
a situation where deceased's vehicle was actually well into
and in the process of crossing an intersection while the defendant was coming towards the intersection at a distance
of approximately 250 to 300 feet to the north. According
to defendant, he was travelling at a speed of 35 to 40 miles.
He recognized that the vehicle in the intersection was going
to cross and that there was trouble ahead. He honked his
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horn. He knew that under conditions then existing his own
vehicle could be stopped only at a distance of approximately 175 feet. The deceased, in the intersection, did not give
any sign of having heard the horn at all. He was entirely
oblivious to his danger. Realizing all of this, the defendant continued without any attempt whatever to slow down
or stop until he was about 55 feet from the intersection,
where his brakes were first locked, and then he turned off
to the right, into the very path taken by the vehicle which
had then cleared the travelled roadway.
Certainly all of the elements essential to the application of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine are here present.
It is not necessary that the plaintiff admit negligence on
the part of the deceased. Juznik v. Kansas City Southern
Railway, 199 P. 90; Independent Lumber Co. v. Leatherwood, 79 P (2) 1052. The deceased was in a position of
danger which he was unaware of and totally oblivious to.
The doctrine can be envoked, not only for physical inability
to avoid danger, but also if the plaintiff was unaware of or
oblivious to his danger. Jensen v. D. & R. G. Ry. Co., Utah,
138 Pac. 1185; Gardner v. Union Oil Company, supra; Cody
v. Sanford, 207 P. 45; Mosso v. E. H. Stanton Co., Wash.,
134 P. 941; Raggio v. Mallory, 76 P (2) 660; Helma v. Bradley, 56 P (2) 607. The defendant was aware of the deceased's perilous position and of the impending disaster.
By his own admission, he recognized it when he was 250
or 300 feet to the north of the intersection; but, even so,
actual knowledge of the peril it not necessary-if by acting
as a reasonable prudent person the defendant should have
known. Richards v. Palace Laundry, 55 Utah 409, 186 Pac.
439. Continued movement of the plaintiff toward a place of
danger after a warning sound is notice that he is unaware
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gency, didn't you?"
A. That is exactly right; and that is why I
checked them. That is why I honked the horn." (TR213).
Moreover, defendant Norton testified that he continued to observe the deceased from the time he first saw him
and that the path of the deceased's car, from the time the
witness saw it, was "directly west with the intersection
there; and at no time did I see it falter, turn one way or the
other, or stop, or speed up, or anything. It was one steady
speed." (TR-188).
In response to the question by counsel for appellant as
to how the driver looked as he went across the intersection, defendant Preston L. Norton replied:
"Well, I couldn't see his face and I did observe him
very close. All I could see, it looked like quite a heavy
set fellow with a hat on; and he was kinda slumped
over wheel with his head and face directly west. I
couldn't get his attention to turn his head whatsoever.
Q. How long did he continue in that particular
position?
A. All the way across it, all the time I was observing him up until practically the point of impact."
(TR-188).
Hence, we have here, under appellant's own evidence,
a situation where deceased's vehicle was actually well into
and in the process of crossing an intersection while the defendant was coming towards the intersection at a distance
of approximately 250 to 300 feet to the north. According
to defendant, he was travelling at a speed of 35 to 40 miles.
He recognized that the vehicle in the intersection was going
to cross and that there was trouble ahead. He honked his
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horn. He knew that under conditions then existing his own
vehicle could be stopped only at a distance of approximately 175 feet. The deceased, in the intersection, did not give
any sign of having heard the horn at all. He was entirely
oblivious to his danger. Realizing all of this, the defendant continued without any attempt whatever to slow down
or stop until he was about 55 feet from the intersection,
where his brakes were first locked, and then he turned off
to the right, into the very path taken by the vehicle which
had then cleared the travelled roadway.
Certainly all of the elements essential to the application of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine are here present.
It is not necessary that the plaintiff admit negligence on
the part of the deceased. Juznik v. Kansas City Southern
Railway, 199 P. 90; Independent Lumber Co. v. Leatperwood, 79 P (2) 1052. The deceased was in a positi~n of
danger which he was unaware of and totally oblivious to.
The doctrine can be envoked, not only for physical inability
to avoid danger, but also if the plaintiff was unaware of or
oblivious to his danger. Jensen v. D. & R. G. Ry. Co., Ultah,
138 Pac. 1185; Gardner v~ Union Oil Company, supra; Cody
v. Sanford, 207 P. 45; Mosso v. E. H. Stanton Co., Wash.,
134 P. 941; Raggio v. Mallory, 76 P (2) 660; Helma v. Bradley, 56 P (2) 607. The defendant was aware of the deceased's perilous position and of the impending disaster.
By his own admission, he recognized it when he was 250
or 300 feet to the north of the intersection; but, even so,
actual knowledge of the peril it not necessary-if by acting
as a reasonable prudent person the defendant should have
known. Richards v. Palace Laundry, 55 Utah 409, 186 Pac.
439. Contil)ued movement of the plaintiff toward a place of
danger after a warning sound is notice that he is unaware
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of his peril, and is enough to break the reciprocal balance
of duty, and, if it can be said that he had time to do so,
puts upon the defendant the positive duty of avoiding an
accident. Locke v. Puget Sound International R. and Power Co., 171 Pac. 242. There can be no question whatever
but that the defendant could have slowed down or even
stopped his truck within the 250 or 300 feet from the time
he sounded his first warning and noticed that the plaintiff
was in the act of crossing the intersection. Being on notice as he was, defendant clearly disregarded the duty and
obligation that the law has imposed upon him. See Baldwin v. Devlin, (Kans.) 8 P. (2) 320.
Respondent submits that the instant case is so like
Gardner v. Union Oil Company of California, 13 P (2) 915,
that it cannot be distinguished therefrom. The same rationale should apply here.
The present case is distinguishable from Hickok v.
Skinner, supra, relied upon by appellant. Here the defendant, by his own admission, did in fact recognize the danger
while still approximately 250 to 300 feet from the intersection and while he had time to control the movement of his
truck. There the facts did not establish that the defendant
had a clear chance to appreciate the plaintiff's predicament
and to avoid collision.
The decision of the court in the Hickok case was a decision on the facts of that case, and while the court
stated that the Last Clear Chance Doctrine was of limited
application in the case of moving vehicles, the court did not,
we think, intend to convey the idea that under no circumstances would that doctrine be applied in that type of case.
We think the court in that decision reasoned that in determining whether the Last Clear Chance Doctrine applies,
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the question is not whose negligence came first or last, but
whose negligence was the proximate cause of the ·injury.
The court has said that the negligence of the plaintiff, if
any, does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the
defendant where it appears that the- defendant by exercising reasonable care and prudence might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff nothwithstanding the
plaintiff's negligence. Thompson v. Salt Lake Rapid Tranmt Co., 16 Utah 281, 52 Pac. 92; Hall v. Ogden City Street
R. Co., 13 Utah 243, 44 Pac. 1046, 1049.
Appellants complain that the complaint fails to specify
facts which invoke the operation of the doctrine. General
allegations of negligence, if the evidence is sufficient, will
support an instruction on the Last Clear Chance Doctrine.
Del Mar Garage v. Boden, 179 N. E. 729. Engle v. Bowen,
251 P. 1108. Moreover, paragraph five of plaintiff's complaint, although not specifically naming the doctrine, specifies facts which would support the application of the Last
Clear Chance Doctrine. See: Jensen v. D. & R. G. Icy. Co.,
44 Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1185; Juznik v. Kansas City Southern
Ry. Co., 199 Pac. 90.
The form of the Instruction so given was approved in
Heurich Brewing Co. v. McGavin, 16 Fed. (2) 334, 56 App.
D. C. 389. See also: Grubbs v. Kansas City Public Service
Co., 45 S. W. (2) 71.
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ERRORS NOS. 14 AND 15

This assignment alleges error on the part of the court
in giving Instruction No. 25.
Appellants complain that there is no evidence to support a finding that the defendant failed to maintain a proper lookout. Such contention completely ignores parts of
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defendant Preston L. Norton's own testimony. He testified
that the stop sign was clearly visible from the top of the
hill at the north of the intersection all the way to the intersection. He further tesified that he did not see the deceased enter the intersection at all; that he did not know
whether the deceased had stopped at the stop sign and that
the deceased had reached the east edge of the concrete portion of the highway before he observed or noticed him. The
east edge of the concrete was 44 feet west from the stop
sign. Certainly that evidence alone would be sufficient to
carry the question of whether the defendant had maintained
a proper lookout to the jury. Cf: Dept. of Labor and Industries v. Hickle, (Wash.) 96 P (2) 577.
The duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence to
protect another person against injury is imposed not only
by statute but existed at common law. The evidence here
shows that the defendant saw the deceased when deceased
was well into the intersection and in the process of crossing
the same at a time when defendant was far enough removed
from the intersection so that he could have controlled the
situation. He actually noticed the danger at that distance
and honked his horn. He then had noticed that there was
a person in the act of crossing the intersection and that
knowledge made it his duty as a reasonable man to use
reasonable care and diligence to the end that no act of his
should injure the other driver.
The conduct of defendant Preston L. Norton in approaching the intersection in question as he did, to say the
least, certainly bordered on wantonness.
The plaintiff's complaint embraces the whole conduct
of the defendant. There is no merit in appellant's argument. See Olsen v. Kress Co., 87 Utah 5, 48 P (2) 430.
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ERROR NO. 16
Appellant contends that tlte court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury in accordance with defendants' Request

No.5.
At page 54 of their brief appellant states: "It is not
contended by the defendant that the mere fact of a safety
zone in the middle of the highway next adjacent to the intersection changes the general rules of law applicable to
intersections." The appellant's theory then must be that
if, while crossing the intersection, the deceased knew, or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that if
he continued on across the intersection a collision would
probably result, or, in other words, that if the defendant
was approaching the intersection so close as to constitute
an immediate hazard, then it was deceased's duty to refrain
from pursuing such course and to stop his vehicle.
That theory was presented to the jury in not less than
five Instructions. See Instructions numbered 7, 8, 11, 16
andK
Instruction numbered 7 informs the jury that in addition to keeping a proper lookout, a driver must so control
his car as to be able to stop or turn to avoid a collision
with any other vehicle or person upon the highway reasonably within his range of vision.
Instruction No. 8 states, "Ifuwever, if you find by the
preponderance of the evidence that defendant's truck was
so close to said intersection as to indicate to a reasonably
prudent person, under like circumstances, that the deceased,
in attempting to cross said intersection, would create an
immediate hazard, then it was the duty of the deceased to
wait and permit the defendant's truck to pass through the
intersection, before _continuing across."
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By Instruction No. 11 the jury was told:
"You are further instructed that if you find from
a preponderance of the evidence, that the deceased entered and proceeded through said through highway on
12th North and 5th West, at a time when defendant's
truck, while traveling thereon, was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, then the court instructs
you that the deceased was negligent in failing to yield
the right-of-way to defendant's truck; and if you further find that said negligence proximately contributed
to the death of the deceased, your verdict should be
for the defendants, and against the plaintiff, no cause
of action."
Instruction No. 16 states, in part: "If the jury believes from a preponderance of the evidence that at the
time, place, and circumstances of his death, Melvin V. Gren
exercised ordinary care and reasonable diligence, that is,
such care as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise
under like circumstances, before entering upon the through
highway in question, and while proceeding over and across
said Wghway, then he was not guilty of contributory negligence, and the jury would not be warranted in finding
against the plaintiff on that ground." (Boldface supplied).
Instruction numbered 24 provides as follows:
"The jury are further instructed that it was the
duty of the deceased, Melvin V. Gren, in entering and
traversing the said intersection on the occasion in
question, to exercise such care and caution as may be
usually expected of an ordinarily prudent person under like or similar circusmtances, to learn of the oncoming of defendant's truck, and to keep out of its way
and avoid injury therefrom, and if the jury should find
from a preponderance of the evidence that the decedent, Melvin V. Gren, failed to exercise such care and
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diligence for his own safety, and but for such failure
on his part, if any there was, he would not have been
struck, or killed by said truck of defendants, then you
should find for the defendants, although you may believe that the defendant, Norton, was negligent in any
or all respects complained of by plaintiffs, and that
such negligent conduct, if any there was, contributed
to cause, or bring about, the injury and death of said
decedent."
The defendant's theory was amply presented to the
jury. The fact that there were traffic islands separating
north and south bound traffic has nothing to do with the
duty imposed upon the deceased. See Hickok v. Skinner,
supra, where there was no evidence of any such islands.
ERROR NO .. 17

Appellants allege error on t4e part of the court for refusing to give defendant's Request No. 7.
The deceased was not in the position of a driver who
had stopped at the stop sign at a time when the imminency
of collision would have been apprehended by a reasonably
prudent person. We do not understand that the appellant
has ever seriously so contended. The appellant's position
is, if we understand correctly, that the deceased should
have arrested his progress at some point within the intersection itself, and that the basis for such requirement was
the imminency of collision as viewed from that point. That
theory was presented to the jury in not less than five different Instructions. See respondents' brief under Error
No. 16. The requested instruction adds nothing and was
properly refused by the court.
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ERRORS NOS. 18, 19, AND 20
Appellant's final arguments are directed to alleged ,error on the part of the court in refusing to give defendant's
requested Instructions numbered 13, 14, and 15.
With reference to Request numbered 13, the uncontroverted evidence shows that although defendant Preston L.
Norton saw the danger at approximately 300 feet north of
the intersection, he did not actually attempt to decrease
his speed until he was about 100 feet from the intersection.
(TR-195), and that his brakes did not lock until he was
about 55 feet from the intersection.
He knew that
he could, at the speed he was traveling, and with his
load conditions, stop his vehicle only in four times its overall length, or in about 175 to 200 feet.. He "checked" his
brakes at the time he first noted the danger. (TR-196).
At the base of the hill the defendant was traveling at approximately 40 miles per hour. (TR-184). At the time the
defenda.tJ.t started to fully apply his brakes, about 100 feet
north of the intersection, he was going approximately 40
miles per hour. (TR-195). Defendant was going up to 35
miles per hour at the moment of impact. (TR-210). Hence,
it is apparent that defendant did not materially reduce his
speed at all. The allegation in the complaint was that the
defendant "failed to apply the brakes of the truck in time
to avoid the collision herei~ complained of." Obviously,
the appellant's argun1ent is without merit.
Defendant's request numbered 14 was also properly refused. The adn1ission of defendant Preston L. Norton
shows that the deceased was about 44 feet into the intersection before the said defendant first observed or noticeq
him. (TR-182). He didn't see the deceased at the stop sign,and didn't know whether he had stopped or not. The stop
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sign and the intersection were plainly visible to one ap.
proaching from clear to the top of the hill north of the intersection. This evidence alone is sufficient to carry the
question to the jury.
Defendant's Request numbered 15 was also properly
refused. It could not be said that one propelling his vehicle over the heavily traveled intersection in question,
within the limits of Provo City, under such circumstances
that he could not stop the same in less than 175 to 200 feet,
had his vehicle under control; nor could it be meritoriously
argued that one driving a vehicle within the confines of
Provo City at such a speed and under such load conditions
that the same would, and did in fact, skid 55 feet 10 inches,
strike another automobile and push the same sideways or
drag it for an additional 179 feet, and at the same time leave
a solid line of brake marks for a total distance of about 234
feet, had his vehicle under control. One glance at the pictures in evidence here, showing the twisted and mangled
condition of deceased's car, illustrates the great force with
which it was struck-far more forcefully than words could
describe.
None of the charges in question could, upon the state
of the record, have been properly submitted to the jury.
CONCLUSION

There is no prejudicial error in the record of the instant case. The evidence clearly made a jury case. The
jury heard the evidence, viewed the witnesses, and, except
for the claim for damages to deceased's automobile, they re~
ceived the case on all of the issues, and the jury, having
been competently and properly instructed, returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The respondents submit that
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the court will not disturb the verdict until it is shown clearly and convincingly that the defendants were deprived of
a fair trial. That the appellants have failed to do.
Respectfully submitted,
ALDRICH & BULLOCK,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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